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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating 
and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US 
listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national 
models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to 
each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards 
at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies 
are connected to each other essentially through directors who have no more than two board 
positions at the time. A case in between is represented by the US, where a high number of 
companies are connected to each other just like Germany, France, and Italy. However, just 
like the UK, such connections are made through directors who tend to have just two board 
positions at the time, a sign that, differently from Italy, Germany, and France, the UK and US 
networks might not be functional to systemic collusion. 
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1. INTRODUCTION. THE ROLE OF INTERLOCKING DIRECTORSATES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
There are several theories on the function of interlocking directorships. Mizruchi’s (1997) 
comprehensive review on the topic illustrates three main reasons for the formation of 
interlocks: collusion, cooptation and monitoring, and legitimacy, career advancement, and 
social cohesion.   
 
As for the first reason, the extensive debate on the causes and consequences of interlocks 
started in the early twentieth century when the US Senate Pujo Committee, analysing the 
linkages between the main New York banks and the industrial sector, argued that interlocks 
between competitors provided a means of restricting competition. In 1914 Section 8 of the 
Clayton Act expressly prohibited interlocks between firms competing in the same markets. 
Pennings (1980) found a positive association between industry concentration an horizontal 
ties (interlocking directors between firms operating in the same sector), while Burt (1983) 
found an inverted U-shaped function: in the case of very high market concentration, the few 
producers have little need to interlock to set prices. 
 
A second reason for the formation of interlocks is cooptation and monitoring (Dooley, 1969 
and Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994). According to Selznick (1949), firms invite on their board 
representatives of the various resources they depend on to reduce  environmental incertainty 
and maintaining their position in the market. For this reason companies have on their boards 
bankers, suppliers, clients (Pfeffer e Salancik, 1978). As regards monitoring, information 
theories hold that there are information asymmetries between creditors and debtors, since 
creditors know less about the quality of debtors. Interlocking is one of those institutions that 
can help surmount information asymmetry by offering access to internal information 
(Mariolis, 1975). Through membership in directorates and boards banks are able to keep the 
company management under their influence. Dooley (1969) finds that less solvent firms are 
likely to be interlocked with banks. Later studies also report that firms with high debt-to-
equity ratios (Pfeffer, 1972) or organizations with an increased demand for capital (Mizruchi 
and Stearns, 1988) have a higher tendency to interlock their boards. The quest for legitimacy 
is a further source of interlocking (Selznick, 1957). In order to better their reputation firms 
invite on their boards individuals with ties to important organisations. 
 
Moving from a firm perspective to an individual director perspective, that is from a demand 
perspective to a supply perspective, Zajac (1988) states that one reason for interlocks is the 
fact that individuals join boards for financial remuneration, prestige, and contacts that may 
prove useful in securing subsequent employment opportunities. Furthermore, according to 
Useem (1984), interlocks are a tool to promote upper-class cohesion creating a business elite. 
Such incentives for directors to assume multiple directorships might have negative 
consequences. According to Ferris et al. (2003)  and Fich and Shivdasani (2006), multiple 
directorships place an excessive burden on directors with a negative impact on their ability to 
monitor and influence managers (business hypothesis). 
 
More in particular, those empirical studies that examine the hypothesis of collusion find that 
interlocking directorates can have a negative impact on the economic system since they 
endanger the independence of interlocked firms, decrease competition in the market for 
corporate control, exacerbate agency problems, violate directors’ fiduciary obligations as the 
agents of stockholders (Fich and White, 2005), and improve the ability of the controlling 
shareholders to expropriate the minority shareholders, extracting  private benefits from 
control (Barucci 2006). As regards the market for corporate control, Cotter et al. (1997) study 
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director interlocks between bidder and target firms. Their findings suggest that the presence of 
director interlocks reduces the gains to target shareholders and decreases the likelihood that a 
target firm receives multiple bids. Moreover, Fich and White (2003) report a negative 
association between the number of interlocking directorships and the probability of CEO 
turnover. Finally, as regards the risk of expropriation of minority shareholders, according to 
Bertoni and Randone (2006) this risk is higher for companies tied by board interlocks, 
because these firms are more likely to act in concert entailing an advantage for the controlling 
shareholders who appoint the majority of directors and a higher risk of expropriation for non-
controlling shareholders. 
 
Much empirical research has been carried out on the effect of interlocks on firm performance. 
Having seen above the plurality of the views on the function of interlocks, it is with no 
surprise that results of these studies are mixed (Bunting, 1976, Pennings, 1980, Burt, 1983, 
Fligstein and Brantley, 1992, and Phan et al. 2003). For instance, according to the reputation 
hypothesis, entering in the corporate elite has a positive impact on firms’ value, while the 
business hypothesis assumes the opposite effect. 
 
Another important part of the empirical literature on interlocks focuses on providing data on 
the actual  extent of interlocks in several countries. These studies analyse the structure of the 
networks created by interlocking directors and match the “small world phenomenon”, a 
situation in which firms have a high degree of interconnection through a relatively small 
number of firms  which act as hubs. 
 
According to Elouaer (2006), the largest listed companies are at the center of the network in 
France, and 30% of the more connected companies are represented by financial companies. 
Moreover, according to Yeo, Pochet and Alcuff (2003) the French network is formed in a 
significant proportion by executive directors. 
 
To our knowledge only two studies have attempted to address in a systematic way the 
comparison among the national networks: Stokman and Wasseur (1985) and Leo Mac Canna 
et al. (1998), who both use a database dating back to 1976. Another attempt more limited in 
scope is made by Elouaer (2006) who compares the French network with the UK’s one, using 
for the latter data from Stokman, Ziegler and Scott (1986). The comparison shows a 
substantial uniformity between the networks of the two countries. 
 
Finally, from the comparative study of the UK and German networks by Windolf and Beyer 
(1996) in Germany most of the companies that share the same directors tend to belong to the 
same economic sector and are also characterised by cross-ownership links. In the UK 
financial companies tend to be connected with non-financial ones and not to have cross-
ownership links. The authors conclude that the German network shows the features of a 
collusive system, while the UK one of a competitive system. 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by 
illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, 
UK and US listed Blue Chips. Chapter 2 illustrates the methodology and data; chapter 3.1 to 
3.5 illustrate the characteristics of the country networks considered; chapter 4 concludes. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA  
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Our database is made of all the directors of the first forty Blue Chips in the five countries 
considered.2 In particular, for Italy we have examined the companies making the S & P - MIB 
40 index;3 for France the companies belonging to the CAC 40 index,4 for the UK the first 
forty companies by capitalization belonging to the FTSE 100 index, 5  for Germany the 
companies belonging to the DAX 40 index,6 and for the US the first forty companies by 
capitalization belonging to the NYSE US 100 Index.7 In total we considered a number of 
directorships equal to 575 in Italy,8 595 in France, 515 in the UK, 796 in Germany, and 489 in 
the US, for a total of 2718 directorships. 
 
The data analysis9 is made according to the principles of the exploratory data analysis10 as 
regards the number of directorships in all the five countries considered (Table 1-4). The 
analysis then moves on to apply the Social Network Analysis (SNA) 11  to describe the 
networks’ general structure and their centrality (Table 5 and fig. 1-4). 
 
3.1.  ITALY 
                                                 
2
 The board composition refers for Italy to 31 December 2007, for France and the UK March 2008, for Germany 
August 2008, and for the US to the annual reports 2008. In case of companies with a supevisory board and a 
management board (as is the case in Italy, in France and in Germany), both boards have been considered. For 
Italy the source of the directorships is the Consob website: www.consob.it , for France, the UK and Germany the 
list of the directors has been downloaded from the companies’ websites, while for the US from the 2008 annual 
reports. The complete list of the websites accessed is available from the authors at any time upon simple request. 
3
 That is (as of 18 March 2008): A2A, Alitalia, Alleanza Assicurazioni, Assicurazioni Generali, Atlantia, 
Autogrill, MPS, BPM, Bulgari, Buzzi Unicem, ENI, ENEL, Fiat, Fastweb, Finmeccanica, Fondiaria – SAI, 
Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso, Impregilo, Italcementi, Lottomatica, Luxottica, Mediaset, Mediolanum, 
Mondadori, Parmalat, Pirelli, Prysmian, Seat, Snam, Saipem, Telecom Italia, Tenaris, Terna, Unicredito Italiano, 
Unipol, Banco Popolare, Intesa Sanpaolo, UBI, Mediobanca, STMicroelectronics. La nostra analisi per l’Italia 
non include Tenaris e quindi si basa su 39 società invece di 40. 
4
 That is (as of 23 January 2008): Accor, Air France-Klm, Alcatel-Lucent, Alstom, ArcelorMittal, BNP Paribas, 
Bouygues, Air Liquide, Capgemini, Carrefour, Crédite Agricole, Dexia, Danone, EADS, Essilor, France 
Telecom, Oreal, Gaz de France, Lafarge, LVMH, Pernod Ricard, PPR, Renault, Sanofi-Aventis, Saint-Gobain, 
Suez, Total, Veolia, Vinci, Axa, EDF, Unibail-Rodamco, Peugeot, Schneider, Vallourec, Vivendi, Michelin, 
STMicroelectronics, Societe Generale, Lagardere. 
5
 That is (as of 15 March 2008): Royal Dutch Shell, BP, BHP, Vodafone, Rio Tinto, GlaxoSmithKline, BAT, 
Tesco, Diageo, HSBC, Astrazeneca, BT Group, Reckitt Benckiser, Imperial Tobacco, Aviva, Kazakhmys, 
Centrica, Lloyds TSB, Standard Chartered, Prudential, Man Group, SabMiller, BG, Royal Bank of Scotland, 
Unilever, Cadbury Schweppes, Anglo American, Scottish & Newcastle, WM Morrison Supermarkets, Carnival, 
Scottish & Southern Energy, British Sky Broadcasting, Legal & General, Xstrata, HBOS, Reuters, Barclays, 
Rolls-Royce, BAE Systems, National Grid.  
6
 That is (as of 7 April 2008): Allianz, Basf, BMW, Bayer, Siemens, Volksvagen, E. On, Daimler, Metro, 
ThyssenKrupp, RWE, Man, Deutsche Borse, Linde, Beiersdorf, Deutsche Post, Celesio, Deutsche Telekom, 
Fraport, Adidas, Fresenius, EADS, HeidelbergCement, Salzgitter, TUI, Hochtief, Merck, Munich Re, Fresenius, 
Commerzbank, Wacker, AMB Generali, K+S, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Postbank, SAP, Continental, Lufthansa, 
Henkel. Our analysis includes 39 companies out of 40.  
7
 That is (as of 2 September 2008): Exxonmobil, General Electric (GE), Procter & Gamble (P&G), Johnson & 
Johnson (J&J), AT&T, Chevron, IBM, Wal-Mart, Bank of America, JPMorgan, Pfizer, ConocoPhillips, Hewlett-
Packard (HP), Philip Morris Int., Schlumberger, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo (Pepsi), Citigroup, Verizon 
Communications (Verizon), Wells Fargo, Abbott Laboratories (Abbott), Merck, McDonald's, Occidental 
Petroleum (Oxy), Monsanto, Medtronic, United Technologies (Utc), Goldman Sachs, Time Warner, Walt Disney, 
Wyeth, U.S. Bancorp (Bancorp), CVS Caremark (CVS), American International Group (AIG), Exelon, 
Anheuser-Busch, 3M, Genentech, Home Depot, Eli Lilly.  
8
 Il dato non include Tenaris.  
9
 The software used has been Borgatti, Everett and Freeman (2002). 
10
 Exploratory Data Analysis according to the definition given by Nooy et al  (2005). 
11
 See Wasserman and Faust (1994) and De Nooy (2005) as regards the SNA methodology with particolar 
reference to the network structure. 
 5 
Figure 1 shows the network of the Italian listed companies considered which are connected 
through directors who seat at least on two different company boards. The first observation is 
that the first component12 is made of 31 companies linked with each other through a high 
density 13  of connections (Table 1). This density translates into a significant number of 
directors who serve on at least three companies here considered (Table 2 and 3): fifteen in 
total (2.6% of the total number of directors cosidered), with one director serving on five 
boards, four directors on four boards, and ten directors on three boards.  
 
We now continue examining the features of the company network made of those Italian listed 
companies that belong to the first component. We want to identify whether there are 
companies that play a pivotal role, that is which companies are the necessary nodes to ensure 
the the communication of all the listed companies involved. We make recourse to two 
measures of interconnection, Freeman Degree and Betweenness. The Freeman Degree is a 
measure of local centrality, that is the potentiality to act or communicate with a specified 
number of directors. The Freeman Degree identifies here the extent of connections of a 
company with directors belonging also to other companies. However, a high Freeman Degree 
can correspond to a low or high level of centrality with respect to the entire company network. 
We then make recourse to the indicator called Betweenness which is a measure of centrality 
within the entire network. Betweenness indicates the number of paths that pass through a 
node. In this context, a node indicates a company, and a path indicates the shortest route 
which relies two companies through board interlocks. Betweenness is a complementary 
measure with respect to the Freeman Degree because it allows to specify whether a company 
has a central or peripheral position within the entire network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, 
Freeman, 1979, and Borgatti, 2005). 
 
Figure 1 and Table 4 show that the Italian Blue Chip with highest level of "Freeman Degree", 
with largest number of connections with directors also serving on other company boards 
(Pirelli) is characterized by having connections with 22 other directors belonging to 14 
companies, followed by Mediobanca with 17 (12 companies) and Atlantia (16 directors and 
10 companies). Figure 1 and Table 5 illustrate the ranking of the first ten Italian listed 
companies according to their Betweenness: in the first places Pirelli, Assicurazioni Generali, 
Mediobanca and Atlantia. We conclude that the Italian Blue Chips with the higher number of 
connections tend to be located at the center of the network. 
 
3.2. FRANCE  
The first observation related to the network of French companies (Figure 2) is that the first 
component is made of 39 companies out of 40: virtually all the French Blue Chips are 
connected with each other through interlocking directorships. Such 39 companies are linked 
with each other through a density of connections which is higher than in the case of Italy. 
(Table 1). In the French case a higher number of directors than Italy with at least three 
directorships connects the said 39 companies (Table 2 and 3): 26 in all (4.4% of the total 
directors considered), with one director serving on six company boards, five directors serving 
on four boards, and twenty directors serving on three boards.  
                                                 
12
 We define as components of the network the sets of nodes (companies) through which it is possible to reach 
other nodes. The first component is made of the higher number of companies (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
13
 Given a specified number of companies and of directors, density indicates the ratio between the number of ties 
and its total possible number.  A tie is a link between two companies established through their having a director 
in common or between two or more directors sitting on the same board. The higher the density of a network of 
companies or directors, the higher the number of links among the companies or directors. Moreover, the more 
numerous the directors who connect the companies belonging to the examined network, the higher the network 
density. (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
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Moving on to the centrality measures, figure 2 and Table 4 show that the companies with a 
higher Freeman Degree (Paribas, Accor, Total) have a number of links to other directors 
similar to those of the main Italian Blue Chips (but a higher number of companies linked 
through a lower number of interlocked directors). Figure 2 and Table 5 indicate that, as in the 
case of Italy, companies with a higher "Freeman Degree" also tend to be those who are at the 
center of the network, which also takes in this case a centralized form. 
 
3.3. GERMANY  
 
In the case of the network of German companies (Figure 3) the first component is made of 38 
companies out of the 39 examined: even in this case, as for France, virtually all the German 
Blue Chips are connected with each other through interlocking directorships. However, such 
38 companies are linked with each other through a density of connections which is higher 
than in the case of France, and almost double than Italy. (Table 1). In the German case we 
also have a high number of directors with at least three directorships connects the said 39 
companies (Table 2 and 3): 23 in all (2.1% of the total directors considered), with six 
directors serving on four company boards, and seventeen serving on three boards.  
 
As for the centrality measures, Figure 3 and Table 4 show that the companies with a higher 
Freeman Degree (E. On, Bayer,Allianz) have a number of links to other directors similar to 
those of the main Italian and French Blue Chips. Figure 3 and Table 5 indicate that, as in the 
case of Italy and France, companies with a higher "Freeman Degree" also tend to be those 
who are at the center of the network, which also takes in this case a centralized form. 
 
 
3.4. THE UNITED KIMGDOM 
The Network of the UK companies (Figure 4 and Table 1) is made of 26 companies 
connected in the first component, two companies making up the second, and 12 isolates. The 
first component is then made by a number of companies largely inferior compared to France, 
Germany and Italy, with also a much lower density, as also witnessed by the presence of just 
two directors with three directorships (Table 2 and 3).  
 
Concerning centrality measures, Fig. 4 and the tab. 4 show that the UK Blue Chips have 
lower values of Freeman Degree than Italy, Germany and France (5 directors of other 
companies in the network connected with Centrica against 22 for Pirelli and 21 for Paribas). 
On the contrary (Table 5) the Betweenness of British companies in the national network tends 
to be higher for the three countries previously examined. This is due to the fact that fewer 
British Blue Chips have links with a smaller number of companies and directors from other 
companies and also to the shape of the British network which is much more elongated than 
the Italian, French and German network, with a much longer distance between the peripheral 
and the central companies of the network. 
 
In the case of the first three countries any two companies are linked with a high degree of 
redundancy: this situazion makes each link less determinant in the maintenance of the 
network. On the contrary, the UK network is based on a limited number of links between a 
limited number of companies and so the companies with a central position assume a greater 
centrality (Betweenness) in the network. As a consequence the British network is 
characterized by the presence of many "cut-off points", links between companies whose 
disappearance would lead to the exclusion of one or more companies from the first 
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component and increase the number of components of the network. In the Italian, French and 
German networks, cut-off points are a very small number (fig. 1-2-3). 
 
3.5. THE UNITED STATES 
The US network (Figure 5) is made for its first component of 35 companies out of the 40 
examined, finding its place just behind France and Germany and ahead of Italy. However, 
such 35 companies are linked with each other through a density of connections which is much 
lower than the three mentioned countries and almost equivalent to the UK one (Table 1). The 
latter feature is reflected in the fact that in the US case we also have, just as with the UK, just 
two directors serving on three boards.  
 
As for the centrality measures, Figure 5 and Table 4 show that the companies with a higher 
Freeman Degree (General Electric, UTC) have a low number of links to other directors, close 
to the UK case. However, Figure 5 and Table 5 show that taking Betweenness into account 
the US feature close to France, Germany and Italy rather than the UK, with companies with a 
higher "Freeman Degree" which also tend to be those who are at the center of the network, 
which also takes in this case a centralized form. 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
The purpose of this paper was to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by 
illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, 
UK and US listed Blue Chips. Theoretical contributions identify (besides the interest for 
directors to expand their social relationships) two possible explanations for interlocking 
directorships, on the one hand collusion between operators in the same market or in general 
among companies that have business relations with each other and on the other giving 
creditors access to information on their debtors’ management. 
 
We proceeded by first considering the features of the companies connected to each other in 
each country and then moved on to compare the country networks according to Freeman 
Degree (a measure of local centrality, that is the potentiality to act or communicate with a 
specified number of directors) and Betweenness (which allows to specify whether a company 
has a central or peripheral position within the entire network). 
 
The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. 
On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a 
small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, 
Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to 
each other essentially through directors who have no more than two board positions at the 
time.  
 
A case in between is represented by the US, where a high number of companies are connected 
to each other just like Germany, France, and Italy. However, just like the UK, such 
connections are made through directors who tend to have just two board positions at the time, 
a sign that, differently from Italy, Germany, and France, the UK and US networks might not 
be functional to systemic collusion.  
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Table 1. Country networks: descriptive statistics  
Country network Components N. of companies  
In first component 
N. of isolates Density 
Italy  9 31 8 0.1039 
France  2 39 1 0.1551 
UK  14 26 12 0.041 
Germany 2 38 1 0.1984 
US 6 35 6 0.0564 
 
 
Table 2. Board directorships in the countries considered   
US Total Rel. freq. Cum. freq. France Total Rel. freq. Cum. freq. 
1 448 0.916 1 1 413 0.694 1 
2 39 0.079 0.084 2 48 0.081 0.125 
3 2 0.004 0.004 3 20 0.034 0.044 
    4 5 0.008 0.01 
    5 0 0 0.002 
    6 1 0.002 0.002 
Total 489 1  Total 595 1   
        
Italy Total Rel. freq. Cum. freq. UK Total Rel. freq. Cum. freq. 
1 428 0.744 1 1 457 0.887 1 
2 48 0.083 0.109 2 26 0.05 0.054 
3 10 0.017 0.026 3 2 0.004 0.004 
4 4 0.007 0.009 4 0 0  
5 1 0.002 0.002 5 0 0  
Total 575  1  Total 515 1   
        
Germany Total Rel. freq. Cum. freq.     
1 713 0.895 1     
2 60 0.075 0.105     
3 17 0.021 0.03     
4 6 0.007 0.007     
        
        
Total 796 1      
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Table 3. Number of directorships by country  
France Italy  UK  
  N. of directors directorships   N. of directors directorships   N. of directors directorships 
 1 6  1 5  2 3 
 5 4  4 4  26 2 
 20 3  10 3    
         
 US   Germany     
 2 3  6 4    
 39 2  17 3    
 448 1  60 2    
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Tab. 4 Freeman Degree 
US  Francia CAC 40  
General Electric 7 (7) Bnp Paribas 21 (16) 
UTC 5 (5) Accor 17 (15) 
IBM 4 (4)  Total 16 (11) 
Anheuser-Busch          4 (3) Saint-Gobain 15 
AIG 4 (4) Axa 14 
JPMorgan 4 (4) Lafarge 14 
Wells Fargo 4 (4) Suez 13 
Medtronic 4 (3) Lagardere 13 
  Veolia 12 
  Sanofi Aventis 11 
  Oreal 11 
Italia S&P MIB 40  Gran Bretagna FTSE  
Pirelli & C. Spa 22 (14) Centrica 5 (5) 
Mediobanca Spa 17 (12) Rolls-Royce 4 (4) 
Atlantia Spa 16 (10) Cadbury Schweppes 4 (4) 
Assicurazioni Generali Spa 14 Bt Group 3 
Italcementi Spa Fabbriche Riunite  
Cemento 
14 Bhp 3 
Telecom Italia Spa 12 Royal Dutch Shell 3 
Mediaset Spa 12 Xstrata 3 
Alleanza Assicurazioni Spa 11 Vodafone 3 
Autogrill Spa 11 Reuters 3 
Intesa Sanpaolo Spa 9 Bae Systems 3 
Luxottica Group Spa 9 Bp 3 
Arnoldo Mondatori Editore Spa 9   
Germany    
E. On 19   
Bayer 18   
Allianz 17   
Deutsche Bank 15   
Lufthansa  15   
ThyssenKrupp 14   
Linde 13   
Daimler 13   
Munich RE 12   
BMW 10   
Deutsche Telekom 10   
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Tab. 5 Normalized Betweenness Centrality 
US   Francia Cac 40   
General Electric  20.524 Bnp Paribas 16.47 
AIG 18.444 Accor 10.99 
UTC 17.072 Air Liquide 10.97 
Wells Fargo 17.038 Lagardere 10.184 
Walt Disney 12.877 Eads 10.048 
JPMorgan 12.427 Sanofi Aventis 8.405 
P&G 11.842 Oreal 5.915 
Eli Lilly 11.550 Axa 5.501 
IBM 11.269 France Telecom 5.369 
Anheuser-Busch 10.493 Total 5.337 
Italia S&P Mib 40   Gb Ftse   
Pirelli & C. Spa 13.893 Rolls-Royce 18.668 
Assicurazioni Generali Spa 12.296 Royal Dutch Shell 16.262 
Mediobanca Spa 8.846 Bt Group 15.61 
Atlantia Spa 8.09 Vodafone 13.495 
Luxottica Group Spa 7.002 Centrica 12.506 
Fondiaria - Sai Spa 5.084 Cadbury Schweppes 9.829 
Italcementi Spa Fabbriche Riunite Cemento 4.388 Bhp 8.907 
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena Spa 4.125 Reuters 7.962 
Unicredito Italiano Spa 4.125 British Sky Broadcasting 6.208 
Autogrill Spa 4.072 Rio Tinto 6.208 
Germany    
Allianz 15.635   
Basf 15.074   
Lufthansa 10.222   
Bayer 8.867   
E. On 8.647   
Linde 8.219   
Deutsche Bank 7.132   
Commerzbank 6.523   
ThyssenKrupp 6.090   
Fresenius 5.360   
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Figure 1. The Italian network.  
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Figure 2. The French network.  
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Figure 4. The UK network.  
 17 
Figure 3. The German network. 
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Figure 5. The US network. 
 
 
